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Abstract

Curac;ao
are
undertaken
from
appropriately covered for the purposes
of,
in
particular,
international
responsibility and liability under the
space treaties.

With the first space tourist flights
coming ever closer to reality, the
interests in becoming part of this
challenging new chapter of human
spaceflight are also spreading across
the globe. One of the legally most
interesting projects concerns the plans
of Space Experience Curac;ao, a Dutch
company, to develop a spaceport on
the island of Curac;ao in the Dutch
Antilles, so far famous largely for its
holiday resorts. The aim is to allow as
of 2014 commercial spaceflights to be
undertaken from the island as well as
to start offering such flights itself from
the island.
The Dutch Antilles are part of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands. Hence,
for the purposes of for example the
international space treaties, it falls
under the responsibility and liability of
the Netherlands. The Netherlands
however,
while
indeed
having
enunciated a national space law to
implement the relevant provisions of
those treaties vis-a-vis private space
operators, has so far excluded the
Dutch Antilles from the scope of the
licensing regime thereby established.
Furthermore, the likely involvement of
US operators as clients or partners in
such ventures also raises the issue of
application and applicability of
relevant US law on the matter.
The paper will analyse these main legal
aspects in order to arrive at a
conclusion regarding the extent to
which private commercial spaceflights

1. The plans of Space Experience
Curacao (SXC)
When Scaled Composites in October
2004 succeeded in winning the X-Prize,
proving the viability of using privately
financed, developed, built and operated
spacecraft to transport humans to the
edge of outer space in are-usable
vehicle and thus inaugurating the era of
sub-orbital space tourism, lone of those
looking on in fascination was Mr.
Harry van Hulten, a Dutch test pilot and
major with the Dutch Air Force. Upon
his return to the Netherlands, he
contacted Mr. Ben Droste, amongst
others former Commander of the Dutch
Air Force, former Chairman of the
Board of the Dutch Space Agency and
former Dean of Delft University's
Faculty of Aerospace Sciences.
Rapidly, their discussions evolved into
the establishment of Space Experience
Curac;ao (SXC), a Dutch limited
liability company aiming to develop
space tourism activities from the island
of Curac;ao in the Caribbean. 2 Curac;ao,
part of the Dutch Antilles, was known
to many as a sunny seaside resort with
beautiful sandy beaches, but had been
suffering several economic setbacks
over the last decades and could
certainly do with any economic boost
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ratified all five UN-originating space
treaties. When it did, it did so also on
behalf of the Dutch Antilles: the 1967
5
Outer Space Treat/ on 10 July 1969 ,
6
the 1968 Rescue Agreement on 10 July
19807 , the 1972 Liability ConventionS
on the same date 9 , the 1975
lO
Registration Convention once again
on the same date 11 and finally the 1979
.
as ·1t entere d mto
M oon A greement1 2
force on 11 July 1984.
As a consequence, there is no question
that the Netherlands is the international
respondent for any international legal
claims that would arise out of SXC's
operations.
For example,
flights
conducted from Spaceport Cura<;;ao
would qualify as "national activities in
outer space" for the purpose of Article
VI of the Outer Space Treaty certainly as long as the 100 km-altitude
line above which these flights will
culminate is not officially ruled out as
providing for a borderline between
.
1mrspace
·
natlOna
an d outer space.-13
Thus, the Netherlands would be fully
internationally responsible for those
activities in case other states would
claim they violate some rule of
international law such as that of
national sovereignty over airspace.
Similarly, at the very least the use of
territory that under international law
still has to be qualified as Dutch
territory will, under Article VII of the
Outer Space Treaty in combination
with the Liability Convention l4 , lead to
international
liability
for
the
Netherlands for any damage caused by
space objects launched from Cura<;;ao
such as those involved in SXC
operations.
To quote one last example, the
Netherlands further to its qualification
as a "launching State" for any object so
launched and Article VIII of the Outer
Space Treaty, would be obliged to
register any such launches from the
Dutch Antilles under the Registration

such as a new attraction for tourists,
now more than ever its main source of
Income.
More in detail, SXC plans to undertake
four sets of activities:
1. The
building,
operation
and
exploitation of a Spaceport Cura<;;ao
adjacent to Hato Airport at
Willemstad, in order to offer the
facilities to private or other operators
interested in launching manned as
well as unmanned space vehicles
from Cura<;;ao.
2. The marketing, sales and operation
of spaceflights from the Spaceport
itself.
3. The operation and exploitation of a
space experience centre at the
Spaceport, allowing tourists not able
or willing to take flight themselves
to enjoy other elements of 'the space
experience' .
4. The operation and exploitation of a
knowledge centre targeted to support
and stimulate economic activities on
the island with the high technology
expertise which comes with the
conduct of space activities.
Since from a space (law) perspective
the last two activities are not relevant
the remainder of this analysis will only
deal with the first two activities, the
operation of a spaceport and the
provision of spaceflights from that
spaceport. Moreover, as the private
launch of unmanned space vehicles is,
in general terms, already a quite wellknown phenomenon, the focus here will
be on the launch of manned space
vehicles.

2. The international legal context
The Kingdom of the Netherlands, of
which the Dutch Antilles including
Cura<;;ao, even after the very recent
establishment of the latter's status as an
'autonomous land,3, form part, has
350

Convention, both in a national register
and in the relevant UN register. IS

long as the Netherlands could still
exercise their jurisdiction ratione
personae.
As to the second, apparently the Dutch
authorities did not consider those
organization activities without further
ado to lead to liability for the
Netherlands
under the
Liability
Convention,
for
example
as
constituting 'procurement' thereof 2.
Interestingly, the adjoining explanatory
memorandum specifically refers to the
commercial organization of space
tourist flights as one of the activities
under this heading which might in the
not-too-distant
future
require
application of the Law under this
heading. 23 Of course space tourist
flights conducted themselves from the
territory of the Netherlands would fall
directly within the scope of Section
2(1) of the Law.

3. The national context: the Dutch
Space Law of 2007
For
the
general
purpose
of
implementing its obligations under the
aforementioned UN space treaties, in
particular with a view to the growing
level of private participation in space
activities in the Netherlands,16 in 2007
the Dutch Space Law was enacted17.
The Dutch Space Law provided for a
licensing regime with respect to private
space activities, defined as "the launch,
the flight operation or the guidance of
· ·In outer space ,,18 ,as Iong
space 0 b~ects
as "performed in or from within the
Netherlands or else on or from a Dutch
ship or Dutch aircraft,,19.
By Order in Council the scope of the
application of the Law and its licensing
system may be extended in two
directions. Firstly, the Law may be so
applied to "designated space activities
that are performed by a Dutch natural
or juridical person on or from the
territory of a State that is not party to
the Outer Space Treaty or on or from a
ship or aircraft that falls under the
jurisdiction of a State that is not party
to the Outer Space Treaty"?O
Secondly, its application may be
extended to "the organization of outerspace activities by a natural or juridical
person from within the Netherlands".21
As to the first, the major reasoning
behind this option was to prevent gaps
in the application of the Outer Space
Treaty from appearing as far as the
Netherlands could reasonably be
expected to help it. The option allowed
extension of the application of Law,
otherwise under Article 2( 1) scoped
exclusively ratione loci, to include
cases where no state would ratione loci
feel obliged to exercise jurisdiction, as

4. Application of the Dutch Space Law
to the Dutch Antilles
Already the terminology of the Dutch
Space Law indicated, by referring
plainly to "the Netherlands", that only
the European part of the Kingdom was
intended to be covered, and the
explanatory memorandum confirmed
beyond doubt that the Law was not
supposed to deal with private space
activities from the Dutch Antilles.
Which so far leaves out SXC and its
activities from the scope of application
of the Law and its licensing regime.
The reasons for leaving out the Dutch
Antilles were essentially political ones,
including the sensitivities involved in a
colonial motherland telling its colonies
how to legislate, the insistence of
Aruba under its status aparte to flatly
refuse all space activities to be
conducted from its territory in any
event, and the general intention of the
other Antilles of, should this become
351

any exercise of territorial jurisdiction
over that part of the Kingdom would
come perfectly natural; and with the
explicit reference to space tourism in
the
accompanying
memorandum
nobody could feel taken by surprise.
Of course, as mentioned, SXC at least
presently is a Dutch company, and the
plans of SXC clearly amount to
'organizing' the spaceflights - if not
considerably more. The least one could
say, is that this option could be a lastresort stick-behind-the-door in case the
drafting process in Cura<;ao does not
satisfy the Dutch authorities, worried
about
Dutch
international
responsibility and liability.

necessary or desirable, indeed drafting
some (local) legislation taking care of
the matter.
As a consequence Cura<;ao, thanks to
SXC and the positive reception its
plans have received on the island, is
now also going to develop its
appropriate legal regime, a kind of
local version of a national space law. 24
Most fundamentally, such a local
regulation will have to take care of the
international responsibility and liability
as still resting with the Dutch
government in the Netherlands, as well
as with some version of a local
registration.
If somehow Cura<;ao would fail to do
so, or to do so in a manner considered
sufficient for the purpose by the Dutch
government, the question reverts back
to whether the latter would then be
willing and able to use the options to
extend the scope of the Law by means
of an Order in Council to ensure
application of the licensing system on
the island as well.
The first option mentioned earlier is
formally targeted at a different
situation. An absence of (appropriate)
local regulation in Cura<;ao may
perhaps equate to an absence of local
application of the Outer Space Treaty,
but it would be to the detriment of the
Dutch government (in other words,
essentially a domestic issue), not of the
claimant state, which is the main
concern and raison d'etre of the
international space treaties as far as
these issues are concerned. It would be
stretching this clause rather far if it
were to be used as an argument for
extending the scope of the Dutch
Space Law to Cura<;ao, even apart
from the political issues.
This would be considerably different
with the second option, however.
Though it would only work to the
extent the organization of the activities
would take place from the Netherlands,

5. The involvement of the US legal
regime for private manned spaceflight
In the above already a few times
mention has been made of the United
States, so before addressing the further
issue of prospective local Cura<;ao
regulation, the question will be
addressed how the US legal regime
may become involved in the context of
private commercial manned spaceflight
from the island. The United States
happens to be in the possession of the
largest experience with regulating
private spaceflight in general and of the
most elaborate national regime, even if
only of a temporary nature, for manned
private spaceflight with the latest
fundamental amendments to the
Commercial Space Launch Act25 and
follow-on regulations codified in the
Code of Federal Regulations.
This US legal regime actually may
become involved along two lines, both
focusing on the US licensing regime for
operating spaceflights (as the operation
of Spaceport Cura<;ao itself as a launch
facility would remain exclusively in
Dutch hands). The US licensing regime
applies not only ratione loci to flights
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conducted from the United States, but
also to launches conducted elsewhere,
namely ratione personae as far as
undertaken by "a citizen of the United
States",
under
three
different
.
26
scenanos.
The first pertains inter alia to cases
where that citizen is to be defined as
"an entity organized or existing under
the laws of the United States or a State"
so that any US company launching
from
SXC
facilities
would
automatically require such a license. 27
The second and third both pertain to
cases where such a citizen is by
contrast to be defined as "an entity
organized or existing under the laws of
a foreign country if the controlling
interest (as defined by the Secretary of
Transportation) is held by an individual
or entity described in subclause (A) or
(B) of this clause [meaning Section
70 102]", where the one scenario
relevant here requires that the launch
takes place "in the territory of a foreign
country if there is an agreement
between the United States Government
and the government of the foreign
country providing that the United States
Government has jurisdiction over the
launch".28 This reflects obviously a
more complex case, where a company
is not a US company under
international law (being incorporated
outside the United States) yet is
controlled by US interests as indicated,
and operates from Cura<;ao with
Cura<;ao / The Netherlands willing to
agree to US jurisdiction being exercised
over the launch.
In so far as this regime would simply
apply to US companies using Spaceport
Cura<;ao as (one of) their base(s) for
manned spaceflight operations, the
question arises regarding the nationality
of the potential customers which might
seek the services of SXc. It is probably
fair to say that at present globally
speaking three companies have plans

advanced far enough to be taken into
consideration here: Virgin Galactic29 ,
XCOR30 and Rocketplane 31 .
Of these, the latter two are without
further ado US companies, and hence
would require a US license under the
Commercial
Space
Launch
Act
regardless of whether Cura<;ao (or the
Netherlands, should the last-resort
option there become reality) would
come to require a license for their
launch activities as well
the first
scenario mentioned.
The former, however, is a UK
company, part of the UK Virgin Group
consortium,32 with no indication that a
"controlling interest" under a normal
interpretation would be held by US
citizens or entities. On the other hand,
Virgin Galactic is using the technology
of Scaled Composites, a US company,
brought into a separate daughter
company The Space Company, a US
company as well even if majorityowned by Virgin Galactic. 33 If therefore
the US Secretary of Transportation,
read the FAA's Office of Commercial
Space Transportation (OCST), would
come to define "controlling interest"
along the lines of such involvement of
critical US-patented and US-owned
technology, Virgin's operations might
still require a US license under the
Commercial Space Launch Act.34 This
may be stretching the concept of
"controlling
interest"
quite
far,
however, and even if the FAA's OCST
would define it as such, application of
the licensing regime would furthermore
be subject to an agreement with
Cura<;ao / The Netherlands thereon the other scenario mentioned.
The relatively limited number of
companies (at least soon) able to offer
manned
spaceflight
capabilities
furthermore might well lead to even
closer cooperation between some of
them, for example through such
mechanisms as 'dry lease' or even 'wet
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lease' of space vehicles from the one
operator to the other. For US
companies the key question then is
whether such leases would qualify as
"launch[ing] a launch vehicle" in terms
of the Commercial Space Launch Act,
so as to trigger the automatic
application of the license requirement
under the first scenario. 35
The concepts of 'dry lease' and 'wet
lease' so far are complete unknowns in
space law, no doubt since so far private
commercial manned spaceflight has
remained limited to a few flights of
space tourists on public vehicles - the
Russian Soyuz - to a public facility the International Space Station. The key
elements of the concepts, however, are
quite clear.
A 'dry lease' would simply refer to the
lease of the spacecraft as such, whereby
all relevant operations are conducted by
the lessee. Consequently, the US
authorities would be rather unlikely to
qualify the lessor's involvement as
amounting to "launch[ing] a launch
vehicle" so as to require a license under
the Commercial Space Launch Act while, by contrast, the export of the
spacecraft would be covered by the US
ITARs. 36
This would be rather different for a
'wet lease': the craft leased, the crew
and the technical operations will all be
the lessor's responsibility, essentially
only marketing and selling would be
the lessee's responsibility. What is
more, such key elements of 'wet lease'
are quite familiar in air law to the
extent of having been dealt with in
some international treaties?7
In consequence, there can be little
doubt that the US authorities would
regard a spaceflight undertaken with a
US company as a 'wet lessor' as
"launch[ing] a launch vehicle".
It should be clear, however, that the
mere existence and applicability of the
US regime does not do away as such

with the need to establish a local
Curac;ao regulation.

6. Towards local Curacao regulation
This brings the issue back to what
Curac;ao should or would do, inter alia
with a view to filling any gaps arising
from (non-)application of Dutch and
US legislations or to dealing with any
inconsistencies between those.
When drafting their local regulation,
Curac;ao would likely - following the
lead of both the two fundamental types
of activities that SXC is envisaging
and the twofold approach to the
licensing system that the United
States38 is developing - separate the
licensing of the spaceport operations
from those of the spaceflights
themselves.
Licensing of spaceport operations will
likely be of a more general nature, as it
has to deal basically only with liability
issues
(spaceport
operations
themselves not easily qualifying as
"activities in outer space" under
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty),
and those liability issues will
presumably also be tackled in the
licenses
for
the
spaceflights
themselves. It could, for example, be
provided for a certain period covering
in principle all launches that will
actually be carried out in that period one key parameter here being that
indeed the spaceflight operator itself
will have a sufficiently elaborate
license himself, whether under the
Curac;ao regulation-to-be or under
another state's licensing system.
The licenses for spaceflights, by
contrast, are likely to start out being
granted on a one-by-one basis, on the
assumption
that
the
specific
technology and operational know-how
will change from launch to launch
even with the same spaceflight
354

operator. Only as track records of
certain spaceflight vehicles start to
build up, might class licenses or
licenses for a certain number of
launches become a feasible option for
the regulator.
As to the further substance of the
licensing obligations, in the former case
the supremacy of territorial sovereignty
of the Netherlands and its international
constitutional arrangements vis-a.-vis
Curayao as well as the absence of a
license for spaceport operations under
US law should lead the Curayao
authorities to implement and apply the
prospective license obligation without
much deference to any US (or other)
licenses for spaceflight operations (and
whatever requirements these may have
imposed). It would be sensible though
to actually require such a spaceflight
license before Spaceport Curacao
would be allowed to offer its launch
site services to non-Dutch customers
under its own spaceport license, so as to
ensure that the part of the operations
which is controlled by the spaceflight
provider is also sufficiently screened
before being allowed to proceed.
Especially in the latter case of a
spaceflight license, however, efficacy
and minimising bureaucratic hurdles
would call for the possibility in the
local licensing process to defer to other
if
considered
states'
licenses,
sufficiently elaborate and precise to
cover the Dutch interests in terms of
international responsibility and liability,
and perhaps even to waive the license
requirement altogether. Those Dutch
interests as a minimum include the
possibility that international claims
under the Liability Convention would
be addressed to the Netherlands and
should ensure that such claims would
give rise to appropriate reimbursement
and insurance obligations. Moreover, it
would at least make sense to include in
those licenses the same or similar

requirements in particular the US
regime, as the most articulate on the
issue, would currently impose were it to
apply.
Also, the Curayao regulation should
provide for a solution to the registration
issue, in close cooperation with the
Dutch authorities in the European part
of the Kingdom. The Registration
Convention explicitly speaks of states
(the "launch State(s)") being required
to take care of national and
international registration, and as
indicated
the
Netherlands
has
established a national register following
the 2007 Dutch Space Law. Whilst this
is limited to "space activities as referred
to in Section 2", in first instance
therefore excluding those undertaken
from the Dutch Antilles, any extension
of the scope of the Law by means of an
Order in Council could easily take care
of the fact that the Netherlands remains
responsible also for registration of
relevant flights from Curayao. 39
And as for the Registration Convention,
it does allow states considerable
discretion as to the "contents (... ) and
the conditions under which it is
maintained".40 This would also allow
the Netherlands and Curayao to avoid a
formal extension of the scope of the
Law. A solution could be envisaged
whereby Curayao would develop its
own, local version of a national
register, and in cooperation with the
Dutch authorities would ensure that the
appropriate information, in accordance
with Articles III and IV of the
Registration Convention, will end up in
the international register.

7. Concluding remarks
Without the establishment of a 'local
space regulation' by and for Curayao as
indicated - and as likely being
developed soon - the only real 'gaps'
355

the territorial sovereignty of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
autonomous decision-making powers of
Curac;ao do not (and should not)
principally rule out the possibility for
other customers to use the island's
facilities - such as with Virgin
Galactic, potentially bringing in also
the much less articulate UK regulatory
regime. In all events, the underlying
legal and regulatory basis will be a
locally applicable regime, even as
existing applicability of US or other
national regimes will be taken into
consideration as appropriate. In that
way, Curac;ao will become a truly
attractive private destination not only
for reasons of its sun, sea and sand, but
for 'its' space also.

that would arise would be on the
domestic front, within the Netherlands.
Since the Kingdom as a whole would
remain internationally responsible and
liable for any activities from the island
such as are being developed by SXC,
the current absence of any such
regulation would leave the Kingdom
exposed to international responsibility
and liability claims for such activities
without any proper legal or regulatory
guarantees.
The interests of the Netherlands and
Curac;ao, however, would go further
then merely filling this domestic gap in
an appropriate manner - which at the
same time will make it very likely that
the gap will soon be filled, indeed. The
regulatory regime to be developed will
thus offer all parties concerned, not just
the Netherlands, legal certainty on their
respective responsibilities, liabilities,
rights and obligations, and thus allow
the activities concerned to maximise
the benefits
for
Curac;ao,
the
Netherlands and the private parties
involved. It will also, obviously,
enhance the general trust of public and
customers alike in those activities,
which would seem the only way to
make the business proposals come true
and make them generate the required
economic activity without unduly
endangering, for example, the local
environment.
Finally, it will be clear that the US
regulatory regime will become involved
in various manners (including the
export control issues not further
discussed here). Whilst it will make
sense for the Curac;ao regulation-to-be
to closely scrutinise and in many
respects follow the US regime, it will
also be important to ensure that specific
local or national legal aspects are not
overlooked, or de facto left for the US
authorities to regulate.
After all, whilst application of the US
regime in many cases would be a given,
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